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                  Abstract 
 
The negotiating strategies of parties to a corporate bankruptcy are shaped by the 
rules and procedures of bankruptcy law. The rules have an asymmetric impact on the 
debtor and its creditors. To analyze the effect of this asymmetry, the paper develops a 
model of bankruptcy negotiation based on a binomial process for firm value. The analysis 
produces five novel results. First, bankruptcy rules are shown to produce incentives 
which lead to significant deviations from strict priority even when the costs of bankruptcy 
are negligible. This result is consistent with observed high levels of deviation from strict 
priority. Under conditions of pure risk with no uncertainty, the model predicts that a 
‘pre-packaged’ bankruptcy plan incorporating deviations from strict priority will 
negotiated before any filing. Deviations from strict priority – and creditor losses – are 
seen to be highly sensitive to firm volatility and to the maximum protection period 
allowed by bankruptcy rules. Second, in the presence of bankruptcy costs, risk free (or 
martingale) pricing for claims on the bankrupt corporation is shown to be inappropriate 
since the requisite hedges cannot be formed. Third, the introduction of uncertainty 
produces conditions where pre-pack negotiations will fail and where periods of 
protection will be prolonged. Fourth, the model identifies a shareholder interest in 
postponing many opportunities for restructuring even where such reorganization raises 
the value of the firm. Longer allowable protection periods increase the significant 
deadweight costs arising from this mechanism. Finally, when applied to the pre-filing 
period, the model allows the timing for a filing to be treated as a choice variable for both 
the debtor and its creditors. The choice is shown to be crucially dependent on the likely 
results of any bankruptcy filing, and hence on the volatility and trend in firm value. The 
model identifies the essential interdependence of bankruptcy strategies of the debtor and 
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              1.          Introduction  
 
  The wide variety of corporate bankruptcy outcomes presents a set of unexplained 
puzzles.
2  Despite the relatively simple objectives of bankruptcy law – the preservation of 
value and the equitable distribution of this value – the bankruptcy process delivers results 
which are extremely diverse and largely unexplained by any theoretical model. The time 
required for resolution of individual bankruptcy cases shows wide dispersion. The 
literature offers no theory that explains this variation. The extent of creditor losses both at 
industry and borrower level also shows wide variations. While factors such as seniority, 
security and debt ratios can go some way to providing an explanation of the variability of 
losses 
3,  a high proportion of the variability remains unexplained. This paper outlines the 
nature of this and other patterns of diversity and proposes an analytical framework 
through which many of these patterns are explained.   
 
  Table 1 shows the distribution of times taken to resolve 705 major corporate 
bankruptcies under the Bankruptcy Code (the Code) in the United States in the period 
1980 to 2007.
4  In 9% of cases, agreement was reached between the debtor and its 
creditors on a consensual "pre-packaged" plan before any filing (a 'pre-pack'). Such 
companies emerged from the bankruptcy court within weeks or a short few months.
5  
14% of the firms attempted to negotiate with their creditors prior to the filing but were 
unable to reach a pre-pack agreement. On average, these firms managed to reach a  
                                                 
2 While the terminology and procedural references used in this paper are drawn from the Bankruptcy Code 
of the United States, 11, USC, §§ 1101 – 1174, the model presented in the paper is applicable to the typical 
bankruptcy processes of Canada (Companies Creditors Arrangements Act and the Bankruptcy and 
Insolvency Act) and the parallel legislation in many other free market economies.  
3 See, inter alia, Schuerman [2005]. 
4 The data is drawn from the Bankruptcy Research Database (BRD) of Professor Lynn LoPucki, UCLA 
School of Law.  
5 In each case, the plan, along with evidence of the required consenting votes from each class of creditors, 
is presented to the court as a ‘pre-packaged’ filing. Court approval is normally routine and the firm emerges 
quickly from bankruptcy protection. While not specifically recognized in the 1978 U.S. Bankruptcy Code, 
pre-packs were generated using the standard provisions of the 1978 Code. The 2005 Bankruptcy Abuse 
Prevention and Consumer Protection Act explicitly recognized ‘pre-packs’. See §341(e) and §1125(g).  See 
Henry [2005], p 418, which provides the text of the Act and includes commentary.    4 
Table 1.    Corporate Bankruptcy Case Outcomes under the Bankruptcy Code
Cases filed 1980 to 2007
Average Number of Cases by
Number Percent Months to          Years to Disposition
of Cases Disposition <1 1 2 3 4 ≥5
Confirmed Plans where the Firm Emerged
Prepackaged Plans 62 9% 1.9 61 1
Pre-Negotiated 96 14% 6.1 91 3 1 1
Not Negotiated before filing 296 42% 19.9 91 114 54 21 7 9
  Total  454 64%
Confirmed Plans where the Firm Did Not Emerge
§ 363 Sales  57 8% 16.4 27 16 7 5 1 1
Merger 15 2% 16.2 5 7 3
Liquidation 131 19% 18.0 53 45 17 10 5 1
  Total  203 29%
Cases Converted 
§ 363 Conversions and 
    Liquidations  48 7% 13.2 28 11 5 3 1
705 100% 356 196 88 39 14 12
Incidence of Refiling:  Firms which Successfully Emerged but Subsequently Refiled
Average
Total of Firms Firms that Percent Years to 
 that Emerged Refiled Refiling Refiling
Prepackaged Plans 62 18 29% 3.7
Pre-Negotiated 96 18 19% 2.9
Not Negotiated before filing 296 58 20% 4.1
  Total  454 94 21% 3.8
Note: the LoPucki data base for cases filed in the years 1980 - 2007 include 745 cases. Of these, 
records on 12 cases were incomplete and omitted from this table. A further 28 cases were still 
pending resolution. 20 of these were filed in the period 2005 - 2007. All cases with pending
resolution were omitted from the table. Due to the inclusion of cases completed in recent years, 
there is a small downward bias in the measure of percent refiling. 
Source:  Bankruptcy Research Database (BRD) of Prof. Lynn LoPucki, UCLA School of Law, 




   5 
consensual agreement within about 6 months after the filing. A further 42% did not 
attempt any pre-filing negotiations with creditors, although they ultimately achieved a 
consensual plan with their creditors and successfully emerged from Chapter 11. These 
firms took on average 19.9 months before the presented a successful plan to their 
creditors. Many took three, four and even five years before emerging from Chapter 11. 
Some explanation is required of the frequency with which so many firms chose to delay 
substantive negotiations with their creditors and accept the costs of extended bankruptcy 
rather than avoiding such costs and sharing the benefits.  
 
  The time needed for reorganization is given as a primary rationale for extended 
periods of protection. But the widespread existence of reorganization options with 
positive present values at the time of filing raises the question of why such opportunities 
were not fully exploited prior to filing, particularly since such moves could have reduced 
the likelihood of bankruptcy. Is there some agency problem that leads to profitable 
options being persistently ignored, or is there some deeper financial mechanism at work 
that produces incentives for the distressed firm to delay value-enhancing opportunities?  
 
  The losses to creditors vary systematically across industries. Data presented by 
Altman and Kishore [1996] indicate that over a 24 year period bond losses on default in 
the textile, construction and transportation industries ranged between 62% and 68%. In 
contrast, losses for the utility sector were averaged 30%.
6  Loss rates in other industries 
fell between these extremes. Some explanation is required for the persistence of lending 
practices under which creditors allow higher loss levels to persist over long periods in 
some industries and not in others.  
 
  In a high percentage of plans, senior creditors accepted a distribution under which 
significant value was allocated to junior creditors and sometimes even equity - even when 
senior creditors suffered significant losses.
7  Since the Code allows creditors to reject 
                                                 
6 Data from Altman and Kishore [1996], republished in  Schuermann [2005] pp 19-20, which provides a 
summary of similar data from various studies.  
7 Franks and Torous [1989] provides a detailed analysis of 27 large corporate Chapter 11 cases from the 
late 1970’s until 1986. Of these 27, 21 exhibit deviations from strict priority. In 18 of these cases, equity   6 
such plans and insist on payout according to strict priority, the widespread practice of 
senior lenders accepting divergences from strict priority needs explanation 
 
  These questions raise the more fundamental analytical issue of whether there is an 
underlying mechanism at work that produces these variations. The fact that over 85% of 
bankruptcies of public companies result in consensual outcomes points to the existence of 
some underlying bargaining mechanism between the firm and its creditors. This 
bargaining mechanism, if it can be identified, should explain a related phenomenon – 
why the shares of insolvent public firms typically trade at a price well above zero, even 
though such firms are bankrupt on any economic basis. Clearly the market routinely 
anticipates recoveries to subordinated debt and equity and applies some calculus to 
estimate such recoveries. The theory of bargaining under bankruptcy should be able to 
identify this pricing algorithm. Since prices for securities of the bankrupt corporation 
continue to trade throughout the bankruptcy period, such an algorithm should apply to 
securities pricing in a consistent fashion both before and during any bankruptcy.  
 
Despite the importance of these questions, the relevant literature is surprisingly 
fragmented and unhelpful in explaining these patterns. Four distinct and largely 
unconnected approaches can be identified. None of these approaches considers the entire 
credit life cycle of the distressed firm from solvency to pre-bankruptcy workout, through 
the filing to the period of protection, and then to the ultimate emergence or liquidation of 
the firm. The first approach examines the period just before and then after the filing 
through to the completion of the case. Two other approaches focus solely on the period 
up to and including the filing, with no attention being given to the actual bankruptcy 
process. Finally, the fourth approach contains some studies that focus solely on filing 
rates while others focus on ultimate loss rates. Yet any coherent theory of bankruptcy 
                                                                                                                                                 
holders received a payment, even though senior creditors took a loss. 17 of the 21 cases involved holders of 
“Debt” and “Notes”. The holders of these obligations agreed to plans which yielded an average loss of 34% 
to their claim. Had the distribution to these claimants followed strict priority, the holders of these 
obligations would have suffered no losses in 10 of the 17 cases. The unweighted average losses for all 17 
cases would have been more than halved to 15.8% under strict priority. Such results are typical of 
consensual plans during subsequent periods.  For further data and analysis of deviation from strict priority, 
see, inter alia, Eberhart, et al,. [1990], LoPucki and Whitford [1990] and [1991], Daigle and Maloney 
[1994], LoPuki [2005], and Weiss and Capkun [2006].   7 
should provide a bargaining model that treats the periods before and after the filing as a 
unified sequence since recovery tactics adopted by the debtor and by its creditors 
typically are chosen well before the filing and continue in a coherent sequence 
throughout the period of protection.  
 
The first and largest body of literature focuses on the legal analysis of bankruptcy 
law, its procedures and practices. This literature puts its primary focus on the period from 
around the filing until the completion of the case. Legal theorists have laid out the 
philosophy behind the bankruptcy code.
8  The bulk of the literature focuses on the 
analysis of legal precedents and processes, and is largely descriptive or normative in 
character. It contains few studies that propose models useful for analyzing how parties to 
a bankruptcy formulate their negotiating strategies. 
9 A number of legal commentators 
have argued that bankruptcy law operates in a manner that impedes the flow of corporate 
assets to higher valued uses. They point to agency problems and the length of time taken 
under protection and suggest that the costs may be excessive.
 10  They also point to the 
high number of firms which exit Chapter 11 with a consensual arrangement and then 
subsequently are forced to file for a second period of protection. In the large population 
of corporate insolvencies shown in Table 1, fully a fifth of the firms that successfully 
emerge from Chapter 11 are forced to re-file within three to four years. Clearly the plans 
of arrangement for the initial bankruptcy of such firms should have failed the viability 
                                                 
8  In particular, see Jackson [1986], esp. Chapter 1, pp. 1 – 6, which provides the classic exposition of the 
objectives and limits of bankruptcy law. Also see  Baird [2001] for a summary of the Code and its 
operation..   
9 Such bargaining analyses include Baird and Picker [1991] and Gertner and Scharfstein [1991]; Daigle and 
Maloney [1994]; and for a more recent model see Mooradian [2004]. These papers, however, do not 
provide models which explain the wide variation in bankruptcy outcomes.  
10  See, inter alia, Baird [1986], White [1989], Easterbrook [1990]. In an empirical examination of the 
effect of the 1978 reform of the Code, Bradley and Rosenzweig [1992] conclude that the changes resulted 
in a bankruptcy process that increased the frequency of bankruptcies and destroyed wealth for both 
creditors and shareholders. They conclude that management were the winners, although neither their model 
nor their empirical data indicate how this wealth was extracted. Warren [1992] vigorously disputed the 
methodology and data behind Bradley and Rosenzweig’s paper. Other analyses arguing the existence of 
inefficiencies include, Gertner and Scharfstein [1991], Weiss and Wruck [1998], Mooradian [1994] 
LoPucki [2005], and Adler, Capkun and Weiss  [2006].    8 
test required by Chapter 11 before the initial plan was approved by the court.
11  This 
result is suggestive of substantial resource misallocation.  
 
While the debate among legal commentators has been vigorous, it has produced 
neither a consensus on the overall degree of inefficiency in the Chapter 11 process - if 
any - nor the appropriate measures to correct any economic inefficiency. 
12 Nor has this 
strand of the literature provides and explanation of why bankruptcy outcomes show such 
high variability.  
 
The second major analytical approach has developed around the analysis of 
capital structure issues and the impact of agency problems. 
13 Stiglitz, [1972], identified 
the incentives for managers to engage in risky projects to take advantage of this 
asymmetry of returns to bondholders and shareholders. Jensen and Meckling [1976] 
identified risk shifting as an agency problem and noted that the problem could be 
exacerbated by bankruptcy. Meyers [1977] identified the inability of shareholders to 
capture all the benefits of a capital injection into a distressed corporation as a source of 
underinvestment in the firm. While this strain in the literature illuminates the problem, it 
focuses on capital structure issues prior to bankruptcy. It has not broadened into the 
empirical analysis of default and loss probabilities that is essential to an understanding of 
bankruptcy and the pricing of credit risk.  
 
A third and more useful approach is based on the insight of Merton [1974] who 
pointed out that corporate securities can be viewed as options on the value of the firm and 
hence can be priced through options theory. In contrast to the legal literature which 
focuses on the period around and after the filing, Merton's approach considers solely the 
period up to and including the filing. Merton and his successors ignore virtually all of the 
                                                 
11 Under §1129(11) a plan cannot be confirmed by the court unless it is  feasible - ie. the plan is unlikely to 
lead to the need for further reorganization of the firm. See commentary on such refilings in LoPucki [2005], 
page 107 ff..  
12 Under the Chapter 11 process, issues of efficiency (preservation of value) and equity (appropriate 
distribution of value) are inextricably interwoven. Bebuchuk [1988] has proposed a process for separating 
these two issues in a manner that preserves the pre-petition priorities, but the suggestion has not generated 
acceptance.  
13 For a summary of this literature, see Myers [2001]   9 
legal process surrounding Chapter 11. The approach uses a stochastic Markov process to 
model the manner in which the value of the solvent firm evolves through time up to the 
point of default.  In Merton's [1974] formulation, if the value of the firm at the time of the 
debt maturity falls below the face value of the debt, default is assumed to take place 
immediately. The firm is liquidated and this value is immediate distributed to creditors by 
strict priority. In such cases, since all creditors’ claims cannot be satisfied, equity receives 
nothing. This basic model, with some structural changes and calibration, has proven to be 
relatively successful when used as a predictive model of default probability 
14  Yet it has 
been far less successful in predicting expected loss on default and hence in identifying 
spreads that will adequately compensate for credit risk.
15  While losses are determined 
endogenously in Merton’s [1974] model, there is no allowance for deviation from strict 
priority. Nor is there any reflection of the fact that most defaults occur well before the 
maturity of debt. Further, the model is inconsistent with patterns of protracted periods of 
protection and with the observation that equity prices remain positive and significant for 
most public corporations under protection.  
 
Various enhancements have been made to this model to reflect these market 
complexities.
16  Jarrow and Turnbull [1995] recognized that default often pre-dates a 
bankruptcy filing, and that it can occur independently of the leverage of the firm. Their 
type of model is often called a ‘reduced form’ model since the value of the firm does not 
enter directly into the calculation of the equilibrium bond price. A binomial distribution is 
used to generate estimates for the timing of a default. The model, however, is not able to 
generate estimates of loss-on-default rates. Instead, model relies on loss rates drawn from 
                                                 
14 The most successful default model is provided by KMV LLC, now a subsidiary of Moody's Investors 
Service. See Crosbie and Bohn, [2003], Dwyer & Qu [2007] and Korablev and Dwyer [2007]. This model 
uses data from the market on firm volatility and data from the firm on debt levels to generate estimates of 
default distributions. Virtually all major banks use data from this model as an imput into their internal risk 
rating process, and the model is accepted by most financial regulators for this purpose. However, while the 
model performs well in forecasting default probabilities for firms short of financial distress, with rising 
default probabilities, the accuracy weakens. When the estimated default frequency exceeds 35%, KMV 
simply records a bullet "35%", leaving the user to generate its own estimate of the true default probability. 
Yet it is this portfolio of higher risk credits that most of the loss in any portfolio will lie. KMV can also fail 
to capture the full extent of correlation in firm default intensities. See Das, et al, [2007]. 
15 See Jones, and Rosenfeld., [1984] for estimates of the accuracy of loss estimation using a Merton-type 
model.   
16  For summaries of the various models that have been proposed see Lando [2004] and Altman [2006]   10 
historical data drawn from some comparable portfolio. These loss rates enter as point 
estimates and, as a result, are not able to reflect the effect of volatility in the firm's value 
on loss rates for the firm. Subsequent models have been proposed that relax this and other 
restrictive assumptions. Duffie and Singleton [1999], for example, propose a stochastic 
loss-on-default function which allows the model to produce 'endogenous' loss estimates. 
A wide variety of papers have proposed other approaches to improve the identification of 
appropriate default intensities. This strain of the literature, however, remains focussed on 
the period prior to the filing.
17  While the use of historical loss rates or some 
endogenously determined spread of loss-on-default implicitly allows for deviations from 
strict priority, the approach contains no bargaining model for the parties to a bankruptcy 
that can illuminate why creditors routinely accept major deviations from strict priority.  
Moreover, these models have failed to demonstrate sufficient empirical precision to be 
adopted by the financial industry as a useful operational algorithm for identifying loss 
distributions.  
 
The fourth major approach directly tackles the problem of forecasting firm-
specific default and loss distributions for solvent firms. In contrast to the Merton-type 
models which rely primarily on two variables – the history in the evolution of the firm’s 
equity prices and the spot leverage of the firm - this approach explicitly considers a wide 
variety of factors that could affect default and loss probabilities. 
18  Altman [1968] 
identified a wide variety of factors that can lead to default and used statistical techniques 
to identify those parameters that most effectively predict default. Other models such as 
“LossCalc” explicitly focus on factors that affect loss levels. 
19  Such models have a 
credible track-record of predicting loss rates at the portfolio level when compared with 
results produced by trained credit professionals and so have found use as a supplemental 
credit tool in banks, particularly for estimating the potential loss on loans to non-public 
companies. Their predictive ability, however, has not proven to be sufficiently robust for 
                                                 
17 One notable exception to this is Carey & Gordy [2007] who propose a stochastic model of firm value that 
carries on from the pre-petition period through the period of protection (see below, footnote 31.).  
18 For a review of papers in this approach, see Altman [2006]. 
19 LossCalc 
TM  a proprietary service provided by Moody’s KMV. See Gupton & Stein [2006].   11 
them to be adopted as a primary tool for portfolio management. 
20 Moreover, none of 
these approaches contains a model of bargaining between the debtor and its creditors in 
bankruptcy. None sheds light on the variability in the periods taken under bankruptcy and 
none explains why creditors routinely accept a significant measure of deviation from 
strict priority.   
 
This paper presents an approach that bridges the theoretical differences between 
these various strands in the literature. It develops a binomial model of bargaining 
between creditors and shareholders that reflects the key features of the Bankruptcy Code 
which affect the bargaining between the parties.
21 The model is structured to apply in a 
consistent manner through both the pre- and post- filing periods. The objective of the 
model is to provide a plausible explanation of the wide range of observed outcomes to the 
bankruptcy process and to identify the factors that can lead to these variations. Section 2 
sets up the bargaining model. Section 3 applies the model to the period prior to filing and 
examines the various tactical considerations bearing on decisions by creditors and by the 
firm to file for protection before a default is declared. Section 4 relates the use of this 
model to the 'gone concern' analysis typically performed by a distressed firm and by the 
holders of its securities.   
  
 
2. Bargaining under Bankruptcy  
 
           a) Conditions of Risk but no Uncertainty. 
 
  The essence of the negotiating problem for the bankrupt firm and its creditors can 
be captured in a simple binomial model of negotiation. This model must reflect three key 
characteristics of the Code.  
 
                                                 
20 For a review of the literature, see Altman, Resti and Sironi [2005] and [2005]. 
21 A similar model in continuous time producing parallel results is developed in Crean [2008].   12 
  First, the model must focus on the recoveries expected by the individual parties. 
Although a primary purpose of the law is to protect the value of the bankrupt company, 
the Code fails to provide any of the players with any direct interest in maximizing the 
overall value of the bankrupt company. Key parties often find that it is in their own self 
interest to frustrate a course of action that maximizes the value of the firm. The 
negotiating model must therefore focus purely on the returns expected by individual 
parties to the bankruptcy.  
 
  Second, to achieve this focus, the distribution rules in the Code must be structured 
into the model. Under these rules, when a firm is so insolvent that there is no value left to 
reorganize and no consensual plan can be reached under Chapter 11, the case will be 
converted to Chapter 7, the firm will be liquidated and the value of the firm will be 
distributed according to strict priority. 
22However, if sufficient value remains and the 
requisite majorities of creditors reach a consensual plan under Chapter 11, the value may 
be distributed according to the scheme proposed in the plan. The Code contains no 
requirement for the distribution arrangements of a consensual plan to reflect strict 
priority.  
 
  Third, the model must reflect a key assumption of the Code that the debtor is in 
most cases the best judge of the proper strategy for managing the company. 
23 
Bankruptcy procedures typically leave the existing management and its board of directors 
in control of the operation of the firm. Although this control is subject to oversight by 
creditor committees and the court,
24 the "debtor-in-possession" retains wide latitude in 
deciding the appropriate strategy for the firm. This latitude allows management, directors 
and shareholders significant opportunities for adopting strategies that maximize their own 
expected recoveries.  
                                                 
22 §726 sets out the obligatory distribution by strict priority in Chapter 7.  
23 Under § 1104 of Chapter 11 a Trustee may be appointed by the court to run the firm. However, before an 
appointment is made by the court to replace the debtor-in-possession, a convincing case must be made to 
the Court that the appointment is in the best interests of the creditors, shareholders and other interests of the 
estate. As a result, such appointments are rarely made in Chapter 11 cases of large public corporations. See, 
inter alia,  Broude [1995], p. 3-24. 
24 Provisions for these committees is made in §705 of the Code, and their appointment and powers are 
specified in §1102(a)1 and §1103(c).   13 
 
  At the time of the filing, the bankruptcy court will impose a stay of proceedings 
that prevents creditors from taking steps to recover amounts owed to them prior to the 
filing. This stay continues automatically until it is raised by the court, usually at the point 
where there is a successful plan or arrangement or a conversion to a Chapter 7 
liquidation. Further, the Code provides the firm with the exclusive right to propose a plan 
of reorganization during the first 120 days; and if the firm proposes a plan, it has another 
60 days to secure acceptance of the plan. This prevents creditors from proposing a 
reorganization plan that might bring an earlier end to the stay. In the past, courts have 
typically extended exclusivity as long as the stay remains in place. While amendments to 
the Code in 2005 limit exclusivity to 18 months from the point of filing, it is far from 




  Creditors may apply to the court for the stay and exclusivity to be lifted on a 
variety of grounds.
26  Secured creditors may request, for example, that the stay be lifted 
on the assets covered by their security. If they can successfully argue that the asset in 
question is not necessary for an "effective reorganization" (i.e. a consensual plan of 
reorganization), the secured creditors have grounds for relief. In rebuttal, debtors 
typically argue that assets covered by security are essential for their ongoing business, 
and courts tend to be sympathetic to such arguments. Further, if management can be 
shown to be unnecessarily eroding value, or if the secured creditors can demonstrate that 
a successful plan of arrangement is unlikely to be achievable, creditors have grounds to 
have the stay lifted. Courts, however, typically exhibit reluctance to lift a stay since a 
                                                 
25 Provisions for the automatic stay is set out under §362 of the Code. Exclusivity is set out in §1121. See 
Baird [2001], p 19-20, for a commentary on exclusivity. In the 2005 amendments to the Code contained in 
the The Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act, a limitation of 18 months was placed 
on exclusivity. For comment, see Henry, [2005], p. 417. Lifting exclusivity, however, may not bring a 
prolonged bankruptcy to a close - it only allows creditors to propose a plan of arrangement. Such a plan 
then must meet the tests set out in §1123 and §1124 of the Code to be successful. Where the structure of a 
corporation’s liabilities is complex, achieving agreement between the various layers of creditors with 
competing interests can be difficult and the period under protection will be prolonged. See Williams 
[2009], pp 6-7. Even where a plan acceptable to creditors is formulated, it is not clear that bankruptcy 
courts - which are courts of equity - will easily allow a plan to come to a vote, especially when the debtor 
may argue that the plan will diminish the ultimate value of the firm.  
26 For an overview, see Baird [2001], pp. 173-181   14 
consensual plan normally appears more effective in preserving value than does 
liquidation. 
27 As a result, motions by creditors to lift the stay and exclusivity cannot be 
frivolous and they are normally infrequent. The result is that the debtor can be left for 
extended periods of time without a significant challenge to its direction of the firm's 
activities. 
 
  Despite the customary leniency of courts, however, the debtor cannot expect 
unlimited time under bankruptcy protection. As Table 1.1 shows, 97% of cases are 
resolved within less than four years; only the most unusual cases take 5 years or more. It 
seems likely, then, that most corporate debtors can count on at least three to four years of 
protection during which they can pursue their restructuring - unless they reach an earlier 
agreement on a consensual plan.  
 
  Taken together, these provisions set the key ground rules within which the debtor 
and its creditors will structure their respective bargaining positions.  
 
  For simplicity, we start with the assumption that the bankruptcy regime allows 
only a single period of protection. At the end of this period, the stay will be lifted, the 
firm will be liquidated and creditors will achieve distribution by strict priority. Consider a 
firm whose debt is $100 million and whose value evolves according to the binomial 
process shown in Figure 2.1 and in Table 2.1. The firm and its creditors are considering 
their options in the time shown by the bubble just before t0 in Figure 2.1. At this point, the 
firm's t0 statements have not yet been released, but it is known that the firm's value at t0 
will be shown to be $100 million. Its covenants will be tested and, since the firm's value 
will not exceed its debt it will be placed into bankruptcy for one period - absent a 
consensual agreement between the firm and its creditors on a pre-pack.  
                                                 
27 The bankruptcy case of Eastern Airlines, while egregious, shows extent to which courts can allow value 
to be eroded as the debtor holds off creditors during a protracted bankruptcy protection. At a series of 
points during a protection period lasting over five years, the court was persuaded that more value would be 
preserved by extending protection in the hope of an early consensual agreement that would avoid the costs 
of an immediate forced liquidation. At filing, Eastern had assets that could have largely repaid creditors. 
When the firm emerged from protection over five years later, nearly 70% of the value of the firm had been 
destroyed. See Jensen [1991], page 29, footnote 64, and the LoPucki data base cited above in Footnote 4. 
For a detailed account of the value destruction in this case see Weiss and Wruck [1998]   15 
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  In this example, the potential value movements of the firm are well known, as are 
the probabilities attached to these movements. Following Knight [1921, pp. 19-20] such a 
conditions can be said to reflect ‘risk’ (which is measurable and can be characterized by 
known probability distributions) but no ‘uncertainty’ (where the probabilities are of ‘a 
non-quantitative type’ that can be estimated only with judgement.) In such circumstances, 
the debtor, its shareholders and creditors share identical outlooks for the firm. In the 
example shown in Table 2.1, each group knows that the company’s value will either rise 
by 10% or will fall by 10% during each period, and they know there is an equal 50% 
probability for each of the two movements. They also know that bankruptcy costs will 
impose a negative 1% cost per year. All parties face a risk free rate of interest of 5% for 
the period and are risk neutral.  
   
  During the brief time indicated by the bubble just before t0, the company  
and its various creditors must each decide on its negotiating strategy. The company’s 
realizable value, were it to be sold at t0, is $100 million. With such a realization, all the 
debt could be repaid, although no value would remain for shareholders. The firm,    16 
Table 2.1
     Expected Liquidation Payouts Payouts to Creditors and to Equity
       Under a 1 Period and under a Two Period Bankruptcy Regime
           $'millions
Variables
Value of Firm at Default 100.0
Value of Debt 100.0
Up Movement per period 10%
Down Movement per period -10%
Probability of an Up Movement 50%
Probability of a Down Movement 50%
Bankruptcy costs per period -1%
Risk Free Interest Rate 5%
Value of Firm
Potential Value Paths: t1 t2 t0 t1 t2
No. 1 Up Up 100.0 108.9 118.6
No. 2 Down 97.0
No. 3 Down Up 89.1 97.0
No. 4 Down 79.4
Expected Firm Values 100.0 99.0 98.0
Present Expected Firm Values 100.0 94.3 88.9
                                           Payouts under Absolute Priority
                  Bond Payouts                    Equity Payouts
                    Time of Liquidation:  t1 t2 t1 t2
No. 1 100.0 100.0 8.9 18.6
No. 2 97.0 0.0
No. 3 89.1 97.0 0.0 0.0
No. 4 79.4 0.0
Expected Payout Values 94.6 93.4 4.5 4.6





however, has the option of filing in t0 for one period of protection at the end of which the 
value of the company will either have risen to $108.9 million or have dropped to $89.1 
million. A filing drops the present expected value of the firm to $94.3 million. Despite 
this drop, shareholders hold a credible threat of postponing distribution until the end of 
the one period of bankruptcy since their expected recovery is $4.2 million (50%   17 
probability of achieving a $8.9 million payout, discounted at 5%). 
28  The filing has the 
effect of providing the shareholders with an increase in their expected recoveries.  
 
  Creditors expect a recovery of only $90.0 million under a one period bankruptcy 
protection. The large drop from the face value of the debt is due to 
the 50% probability that firm value will drop to $89.1 million, in which case creditors 
will lose $10.9 million. Moreover, unsecured creditors lose the time value of their money 
for one period.
29 Creditors can improve on this loss position if, by negotiating a pre-pack 
at t0, the decline in expected firm value is avoided. Creditors have a rational interest in a 
pre-pack that will allow them to ‘purchase’ the option held by shareholders for a one 
period bankruptcy. A pre-pack will allow an immediate sale of the company at $100 
million. The calculus underlying the negotiations is straight forward. Shareholders will be 
better off for any purchase price greater than $4.2 million. Creditors will not offer more 
than $10.0 million (50% probability of a recovery of only $89.1 million, or a loss of 
$10.9 million, with the recovery discounted at 5%). These two values form a band for the 
price negotiations. Since there is no disagreement about the potential future values of the 
firm, absent bargaining inefficiencies, a successful pre-pack will emerge. The deviation 
from strict priority will be between 4.2% and 10.0%. Creditors will agree to this result 
even though their debt is fully covered by the value of the firm in t0 since the automatic 
stay prevents them forcing an immediate liquidation of the firm.  
 
  The positive price accorded to equity in a bankrupt firm is identified by the model 
as a rational valuation placed on the option held by shareholders to choose a period of 
bankruptcy protection. The model explains why the shares in firms that are hopelessly 
bankrupt on any economic basis will continue to trade at positive values even though the 
value of the firm has dropped below the value of the debt.  
 
                                                 
28 Empirical evidence on the role of delay being used as a tactic to improve outcomes for shareholders is 
given in Lopucki, et al., [1990], p 146. For an example of exaggerated use of delay as a bargaining tactic, 
see Weiss and Wruck [1998], op. cit.. 
29 The Code contains no provision under which unpaid interest period can be added to their claim by 
unsecured creditors. Under §506(b), the Code secured creditors are allowed to include a claim for interest 
not received during the protection period.     18 
  The size of the deviation from strict priority is highly sensitive to the scale of the 
up and the down movements - or the 'volatility' - of the firm's value process. Were the 
movements in the firm's value per period only +/- 5%, the band within which deviation 
from strict priority is negotiated would narrow to 1.9% and 7.6%. Were the movements 
to be as high as +/- 15%, the band would widen to between 6.6% and 12.3%.  This result 
is consistent with the observation that losses tend to be higher for industries
30 and firms 
which exhibit higher volatility.
 31 As with the standard options model, increased volatility 
adds to the value of the option.   
 
  While shareholders’ interest in the upside has long been recognized 
32, the interest 
of equity in the downside faced by creditors - which is typically far more significant to 
shareholders - has not been recognized in the literature.  
 
It should be noted that this explanation for deviations from strict priority does not 
depend on the existence of bankruptcy costs. If the trend in expected value of the firm 
equalled the rate of interest so that the expected present value of the firm did not 
deteriorate during the period of protection, and if there were no direct costs associated 
with bankruptcy, the deviation from strict priority would still be significant at 7.1% in 
this one period bankruptcy example. Deviations from strict priority stem purely from the 
operation of the asymmetric distributional rules of bankruptcy law and the normal 
variability in the movement of the firm's value over the bankruptcy protection period.  
 
                                                 
30 For industry data see Schuermann [2005], op. cit., p. 19. The utility industry, with its regulated rates, 
exhibits both low volatility and low loss on default. The textile and construction industries, in contrast, are 
well known to be volatile, and their loss rates are also high. The loss percentages on loans to high tech 
firms in the 2002-2002 tech industry turn-down, most of which firms exhibited very high volatility, were 
exceptionally high.  The model developed in Crean [2009] predicts that in equilibrium - when lenders 
charge a spread sufficient to cover expected losses - loss levels and spreads will be higher for firms and 
industries with higher volatility.  
31 Bradley and Rosenzweig [1992], note 34 on page 1052, recognize the dependence of the option value of 
equity on volatility, although they do not attempt a direct estimation of the link between volatility and 
equity value. The model proposed in Cary and Gordy [2008] implicitly recognizes the link between 
volatility and losses, although the paper plays down the implications for deviations from strict priority (see 
especially Footnote 15, page 29.)   
32  Stiglitz, [1972], identified the incentives for managers to engage in risky projects to take advantage of 
this asymmetry of returns.  See also Jensen and Meckling [1976] who referred to this as ‘the agency cost of 
debt’ (p. 333).     19 
This explanation for deviations from strict priority is much more plausible than 
the standard rationalization which maintains that the deviations are driven by some ill-
defined 'bankruptcy costs' threatened by shareholders. 
33 A shareholder threat to increase 
bankruptcy outlays (other than the minimum running costs associated with extensions to 
the protection period) as a means of driving an increased deviation from strict priority is 
unlikely to be credible. With one major exception discussed below (the avoidance of 
restructuring options which both increase value and decrease volatility), a shareholder 
threat to increase costs and hence increase potential creditor losses would simultaneously 
decrease expected shareholder recoveries.
34  Shareholders would lose a far higher 
percentage of their expected recoveries for a given increase in costs than would creditors. 
Indeed, the rationale for leaving the debtor in charge of the firm's operations is based on 
the supposition that the debtor is best placed and has proper incentives to minimize costs 
and maximize the firm's value.  
 
The extent of deviation from strict priority is very sensitive to the maximum 
period of protection allowed by the bankruptcy regime. If the regime allows two periods 
of protection as shown in Figure 2.2, the upper bound of the range of deviation from strict 
priority rises from 10.0% to 15.3% as is shown in Table 2.1 (the expected present value 
of a creditor payout of $84.7, for a loss of $15.3). Extensions in the number of periods 
allowed under the regime will further widen the band. As with the standard options 
model, increased term adds to the value of the option.  
 
The division of the pre-pack 'dividend' produced by avoiding the need for one or 
more periods of protection will depend on the relative bargaining power of the debtor and 
its creditors. This model provides no guidance on how the pre-pack ‘dividend’ will be  
                                                 
33 See below, pages 31-34 for an analysis of the different types of 'bankruptcy cost' that appear in the 
literature.   
34 This would not be true in a case where shareholders of a distressed firm had zero expectations of any 
recovery and the courts allowed the firm an extended period of protection. The occurrence of such a 
situation, however, is unlikely. If the firm's debt were so high that there were no potential recoveries to 
shareholders under any plausible outcome, creditors would be able to credibly argue to the court that there 
is no potential consensual agreement. The case would then be converted to a Section 363 auction, a Chapter 
7 liquidation, or a combination of the two.  In such cases, the debtor would be unable to threaten increased 
costs as a bargaining tactic for achieving a recovery.    20 
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split. To close this gap, it is tempting to turn to arbitrage free pricing. While the 
‘underlying’ firm value is not traded, a trading position composed of the requisite 
percentage of the bonds and an identical percentage of the shares can be used to simulate 
the price of the underlying firm. In a one period bankruptcy regime, if there were no 
possibility of a pre-pack emerging in the moments just before the filing, application of 
the binomial model indicates that proper hedging strategy would result in bonds being 
priced for a total market value of liabilities of $93.2 million. Shares would be priced to 
give a market capitalization of $6.8 million. These values fit within the negotiation band 
of Table 2.1.  
 
These calculated values, however, do not reflect prices that are free of risk. The 
possibility of a pre-pack agreement at t0 frustrates the establishment of the risk free hedge 
just before t0. A risk free hedge depends on there being only two possible outcomes - the 
two potential values of the firm at t1.  With the possibility of a pre-pack being arranged 
simultaneously with the filing at t0, investors in the time just before t0 face three potential 
outcomes - not the two outcomes of the standard binomial model. Moreover, the payoff   21 
structure of a pre-pack agreement is not determinate. As a result, the requisite hedges 
cannot be established on a risk free basis.  
 
The underlying problem faced by 'risk free' (or martingale) pricing of securities in 
a distressed firm is that the automatic stay suspends any maturity provisions contained in 
the agreements underlying the firm’s liabilities, and any consensual reorganization plan 
will rewrite the underlying ‘contract claims’ for repayment incorporated in the original 
terms of the bonds and other liabilities. As a result, before the terms of the pre-pack 
agreement are settled, the allocation of value between creditors and equity is 
indeterminate. In other words, the payoff structure of the debt and of the equity cannot be 
known until any consensual plan negotiations are complete and the resulting plan 
confirmed by the Court. In multi-period bankruptcy regimes, consensual plans can arise 
at any time during the period of protection. Since the timing and value allocation of any 
plan that achieves consensus cannot be predicted, no generalized risk free pricing 
algorithm can be developed for the securities of corporations operating under a Chapter 
11 regime.  
 
This model provides an explanation for the rarity of rights issues as a solution to 
corporate financial distress. When a company launches a rights issue to raise new capital, 
existing shareholders face the option of either accepting dilution or of investing the 
required capital. At the same time, the rights issue provides creditors with zero cost 
benefits of lowered probability of default and lowered potential loss on default. In other 
words, a rights issue represents a solution through which shareholders bear the full costs 
of solving the financial difficulties and creditors reap a cost-free benefit. As a result, most 
firms opt for bankruptcy instead of a rights issue as a solution to financial distress. 
 
This simple negotiation model under bankruptcy produces results that are 
consistent with a range of observable outcomes. It predicts that where there is variability 
in the possible movements in the firm's value, creditors will vote in favour of a 
consensual plan that allows shareholders some measure of recovery. This deviation from 
strict priority will be larger the greater the volatility in the firm's value. It will also be   22 
larger the longer the period of protection allowed by the bankruptcy regime. The model 
also predicts that corporations will pursue their restructuring through bankruptcy rather 
than through rights issues.  In one important respect, however, the model predicts a 
pattern that is inconsistent with market outcomes. Because of its assumption that 
creditors and the debtor share a common outlook on the likely movements in the firm's 
value - an unrealistic assumption for most bankruptcies - the model predicts that a pre-
pack will be the outcome in all cases. Since only around 9% of firms achieve a pre-pack, 
the assumption of shared views of the future for the firm by creditors and the debtor 
needs to be relaxed.  
 
 
  b)  Conditions of Risk plus Uncertainty  
 
Uncertainty is the norm for corporate bankruptcies. The usual product of 
uncertainty is disagreement about the future of the firm. Differences in view are typically 
driven by different business experiences. Shareholders and management rarely have any 
personal experience with corporate insolvency. They are often surprised that 'events' have 
forced them into a bankruptcy filing. With their long record of managing solvent 
operations, they are generally over-optimistic about the firm's performance in distress. In 
contrast, professional bond and credit managers are familiar with insolvency, and have 
few illusions about the difficulties of recovery. 
35  
 
  The binomial model can be used to analyze the effect of divergences of opinion. 
Table 2.2 shows a firm similar to the one in Table 2.1, but with a down movement equal 
to 5% (instead of 10%) in firm value. The shareholders of this firm optimistically believe 
that there is an 85% probability of the upside movement per period, and hence expect that 
present value of the firm will rise over the period of protection.
 In a one-period 
bankruptcy regime, equity now expects a return with a present value of $7.2 million. 
Creditors attach a 50% probability to each of the value movements, and expect the  
                                                 
35 As the model shows, when shareholders were generally too pessimistic about the outcome of bankruptcy 
and creditors are too optimistic, pre-packs would emerge in a high number of filings – a result that is 
inconsistent with the data.    23 
Table 2.2             Expected Liquidation Payouts to Creditors and to Equity
When Expectations of Creditors and Equity Vary
      and Liquidation occurs either at t1 or at t2
$'millions
Variables Value of Firm at Default 100.0
Value of Debt 100.0
Up Movement per period 10%
Down Movement per period -5%
Bankruptcy costs per period -1%
Risk Free Interest Rate 5%
Value of Firm
                 Time of Liquidation: t1 t2 t0 t1 t2
Possible Paths No. 1 Up Up 100.0 108.9 118.6
No. 2 Down 102.4
No. 3 Down Up 94.1 102.4
No. 4 Down 88.5
Bond Payouts Equity Payouts
t0 t1 t2 t0 t1 t2
No. 1 100.0 100.0 100.0 0.0 8.9 18.6
No. 2 100.0 2.4
No. 3 94.1 100.0 0.0 2.4
No. 4 88.5 0.0
A.   Creditors' View  Probability of an Up Movement 50%
Probability of a Down Movement 50%
Value of Firm
t0 t1 t2
Expected Values 100.0 101.5 103.0
Expected Values at t0  100.0 96.6 93.4
Bond Payouts Equity Payouts
t0 t1 t2 t0 t1 t2
Expected Payout Values 100.0 97.0 97.1 0.0 4.5 5.9
Present Expected Values 100.0 92.4 88.1 0.0 4.2 5.3
B.   Equity's View  Probability of an Up Movement 85%
Probability of a Down Movement 15%
Value of Firm
t0 t1 t2
Expected Firm Value 100.0 106.7 113.8
Expected Values at t0  100.0 101.6 103.2
Bonds Equity
t0 t1 t2 t0 t1 t2
Expected Payout Values 100.0 99.1 99.7 0.0 7.6 14.1
Expected Values at t0  100.0 94.4 90.5 0.0 7.2 12.7 
 
   24 
present value of recoveries will be $92.4 million for losses of $7.6 million. The result is 
still a pre-pack with creditors paying shareholders $7.2 million in value, but the range for 
bargaining has narrowed very substantially to $0.4 million. Had the up movement been as 
little as 1 percentage point higher, the bargaining range would have collapsed and no pre-
pack deal would be achieved. Similar results are obtained when there is a divergence in 
view about the scale of the movements in firm value. This example shows how 
divergences in views about the likely path in the firm’s value can lead to the failure to 
reach a consensual agreement. 
36    
 
If the bankruptcy regime allows two periods of protection, no pre-pack will 
emerge. Equity has a markedly higher expected recovery of $12.7 million. Creditors 
expect losses of no more than $11.9 million and will refuse to meet equity’s requirement 
for a pre-pack transfer of value. This example illustrates how, when there is uncertainty, 
the adoption of a longer allowable period for bankruptcy protection can lead to the failure 
of pre-pack negotiations.  
 
When shareholders and creditors are unable to reach agreement in t0, they will re-
examine their outlook in t1, the end of the first period of bankruptcy. The analytical 
approaches for estimating the potential recovery values will be identical to those used in 
t0, even though the specific forecasts will have changed. In some cases, a consensual plan 
will emerge. On others, there will be no consensus and the period of bankruptcy 
protection will be prolonged. The same type of negotiation will be pursued each period 
when the bankruptcy regime allows multiple periods of protection.  
 
                                                 
36 This section emphasizes the applicability of a choice theoretic model of bankruptcy. Decisions are made 
by the players on a strict opportunity cost basis. In such an environment, costs are strictly subjective. They 
exist only in the minds of decision makers up until the time a decision is made. See Buchanan [1969], 
especially p 43. Ex post analysis of the rational behind particular bankruptcy outcomes is difficult in such 
situations particularly when substantial uncertainty exists and where the data used by the players is rarely 
directly observable. This makes empirical analysis of the reasons behind particular bankruptcy outcomes 
extremely difficult.   25 
The model can be extended to include subordinated debt. The Code requires that a 
plan of reorganization divide creditors into classes of similar exposure.
37  While the Code 
calls for each class to vote on the plan, a plan may be confirmed when a specific class of 
junior creditors has voted against the plan (a 'cram down') as long as creditors in the class 
obtain “not less than the amount such holder would receive .. if the debtor were 
liquidated under chapter 7…”  under absolute priority. 
38  To meet this test, an outside 
valuation must be prepared. Such valuations “ …are expensive and unreliable”. 
39 Since 
there is normally a range of conceivable outcomes and since there is no objective way of 
measuring the ex ante probabilities of any particular outcome, a range of plausible 
valuations is the likely result. Since the interests of many of the parties are strictly 
antithetical, there is likely to be much disagreement on whether a particular valuation that 
meets the strict requirement of this section. Use of this ‘cram down’ provision therefore 
becomes a time-consuming process with little certainty that the valuation chosen in the 
proposed plan will be acceptable to the bankruptcy court.
 40  As a practical result, 
recourse to this procedure is rarely attempted. This result puts creditors of various classes 
back into the bargaining framework outlined above with two main options - a consensual 
plan or a prolongation of the period of protection. To achieve a consensual outcome, 
shareholders and senior creditors will have to be prepared to offer subordinated creditors 
at least the recoveries they expect after a liquidation.  
 
To this point, the model has assumed that the maximum period that the court will 
allow for protection is known with precision in advance. Such foreknowledge, however, 
is not present in the Chapter 11 bankruptcy regime. The uncertainty can lead to 
inefficient bargaining outcomes. Bankruptcy courts are courts of equity. They follow no 
formal rules under which the maximum permissible protection period is announced in 
advance. They seek to protect the interests of all the various parties to the bankruptcy. 
They tend to extend exclusivity protection where there remains a possibility for a 
                                                 
37 §1122 specifies that a plan shall divide claims by creditors into classes of similar claims. §1126 sets out 
the voting rules.   
38 § 1129 (7)(A)(ii).  
39  See Baird [2001, p. 200].  
40 If the process for firm value is indeed stochastic under a typical frequency distribution, there will always 
exist a small finite probability that the debt can be fully repaid. In such a case, creditors can never achieve a 
cram down.   26 
consensual agreement that avoids liquidation. The forbearance of bankruptcy courts, 
however, is not unlimited. If the debtor keeps returning to court with successive requests 
for extensions in exclusivity, at some point the court is likely to listen to creditors claims 
that value is being destroyed. As the data of Table 1 show, bankruptcy courts ultimately 
ensure that cases are brought to an end. The result of this process, however, it to generate 
substantial ex ante uncertainty about the maximum period of protection the court will 
allow in specific cases.  
 
The impact of this ex ante uncertainty on bargaining outcomes can be substantial. 
This can be illustrated through the example in Table 2.2. When both the firm and 
creditors believe the court will allow only one period of bankruptcy, a pre-pack will 
result. However, if the firm at t0 believes that at t1 it will be able to convince the court to 
grant it an extra period of protection, it will refuse the pre-pack. If at t1 the court accepts 
creditor claims of value destruction and rejects a second period of protection, an 
inefficient decision will have been made by the firm. Both creditors and shareholders will 
receive a lower share than under a pre-pack because of the needless deterioration in the 
value of the firm. 
41  
 
The difficulty faced by the courts stems from a time inconsistency problem. 
While courts are not unaware of the problem, in the absence of a workable process to 
examine the preservation of the firm's value inhibits the ability of the courts to contain 
this problem. Public concern at unnecessary value destruction through prolonged periods 
of protection lay behind the provision in the 2005 bankruptcy reform which puts a hard 






                                                 
41 This is a classic case of the application of the Coase Theorem. Coase [1960] argued that when the rights 
of counterparties are ill defined, bargaining outcomes are likely to be inefficient. For a comment on the 
economic impact on the lending market, see below, pages 31-34.     27 
c)   Downsizing Opportunities and Agency Problems 
 
To this point, the examples have assumed that the evolution in the value of the 
firm is exogenously determined. Such an assumption, however, is inappropriate for many 
corporate bankruptcies. A significant percentage of firms enter bankruptcy with a range 
of restructuring options such as the closure of facilities and the sale of assets. Indeed, the 
existence of these restructuring options provides the rationale for the allowance of 
extended protection periods under the Code. The implementation of such restructurings 
will change the path along which the firm's value evolves. 
 
The fact that corporations routinely enter bankruptcy with unexploited 
opportunities for enhancing value raises the question of why such opportunities were not 
fully exploited prior to the filing. In many cases, implementing the restructurings at an 
earlier date would have lessened the likelihood of a filing. Asset sales can provide 
liquidity for the troubled firm. While downsizing may consume cash to cover termination 
packages, improved cash flow can often provide rapid recovery of such outlays. Lenders 
are often prepared temporarily to increase their loans to cover such expenses with a view 
to improving their own expected recoveries. A theory of bankruptcy should provide some 
explanation for why troubled firms delay these advantages until after their filing. 
42 
 
The answer to this puzzle lies in the nature of these unexploited opportunities. 
Many firms file for protection after a period of declining revenues that has left them with 
divisions operating at below capacity and at a loss. Such divisions have operating 
leverage that contributes significantly to the firm's volatility. If the firm’s revenues 
rebound, the divisions will generate significant profits. If the revenues stagnate, these 
divisions will impose costs. Due to the asymmetric nature of bankruptcy distribution 
                                                 
42 John, et al., [1992] provide data showing that the typical operational restructuring for solvent firms 
usually takes one and sometimes up to two years.  30% of the corporate bankruptcies shown in Table 1 that 
filed without any prior negotiation with creditors - presumably those firms that expected long protection 
periods - required two years or more to complete their restructuring and reach a consensual agreement with 
creditors. Such protection periods are well in excess of the periods required to complete most restructuring 
programs outside of bankruptcy. Asset divestitures take a much shorter time to complete. This evidence 
suggests that a significant number of bankrupt corporations delay profitable restructurings until they 
achieve bankruptcy protection, and often well beyond the date of filing.    28 
rules, the shareholders will reap much of the benefit of potential profits from retaining the 
divisions while the creditors will bear most of the potential costs.  
 
An example of such a firm is set out in Table 2.3. The example assumes the 
existence of risk but not of uncertainty. In the absence of an operational restructuring, the 
nominal value of the firm rises over time at an underlying trend at 4%. As this is less than 
the rate of interest at 5%, the real value of the company is expected to decline without a 
restructuring. The potential restructuring would divest underutilized divisions, resulting 
in an increase in the underlying trend to 5%, and a dampening of the up and down 
movements to +/- 4%.  
 
If the restructuring is immediately applied at t0, the firm's real value is stabilized, 
and the position of creditors is improved. However, the expected returns to shareholders 
drop due to the loss of the upside provided by the closed divisions. If only one period of 
protection is allowed, without a restructuring the shareholders will recover $6.9 million. 
In contrast, if the restructuring is implemented at t0, shareholder returns will drop to $5.8 
million. Shareholders therefore have a credible threat to postpone the restructuring, even 
though this choice produces a destruction of firm value. The incentive to postpone the 
restructuring is even stronger in the case of a two period maximum protection period. In 
each case, a pre-pack will result and the lower bound for the price negotiations will be set 
by equity's expected return in the absence of a restructuring.   
 
This example, and its pre-pack result, depended on there being no disagreement 
between the firm and its creditors about the possible future paths of the firm's value and 
the associated probabilities. However, in the presence of uncertainty, there may well be a 
failure to achieve an early consensual plan. Should the bankruptcy regime allow multiple 
periods of protection, shareholders will have a continuing interest in delaying the 
restructuring in the periods after filing. Such an prediction is consistent with long periods 
of protection shown in Table 1 where the debtor is able repeatedly to convince the court 
to rebuff creditor petitions for a lifting of the stay because there remain untapped 
restructuring opportunities that could enhance the value of the firm and because creditors    29 
Table 2.3 Potential Bankruptcy Payouts to Equity
   When there is an Option for an Operational Restructuring 
and Liquidation Occurs either at t1 or at t2
$'millions
Base Restructured
Variables Value of Firm at Default 100.0 100
Value of Debt 100.0 100
Up Movement per period 10% 4%
Down Movement per period -10% -4%
Probability of an Up Movement 50% 50%
Probability of a Down Movement 50% 50%
Trend in Firm Value 4.0% 5.0%
Risk Free Interest Rate 5.0% 5.0%
No Restructuring  -  Base Case
Base Case Value of Firm
         Time of Liquidation: t0 t1 t2
Possible Paths: No. 1 100.0 114.4 130.9
No. 2 107.1
No. 3 93.6 107.1
No. 4 87.6
Expected Firm Values 100.0 104.0 108.2
Present Expected Values 100.0 99.0 98.1
       Payout to Creditors          Payout to Equity
t0 t1 t2 t0 t1 t2
Possible Paths: No. 1 100.0 100.0 100.0 0.0 14.4 30.9
No. 2 100.0 7.1
No. 3 93.6 100.0 0.0 7.1
No. 4 87.6 0.0
Expected Recovery 100.0 96.8 96.9 0.0 7.2 11.3
Expected Values at t0  100.0 92.2 87.9 0.0 6.9 10.2
Payouts when the Restructure is Implemented
Base Case Value of Firm
t0 t1 t2
Possible Paths: No. 1 100.0 109.2 119.2
No. 2 110.1
No. 3 100.8 110.1
No. 4 101.6
Expected Firm Values 100.0 105.0 110.3
Present Expected Values 100.0 100.0 100.0
       Payout to Creditors          Payout to Equity
t0 t1 t2 t0 t1 t2
Possible Paths: No. 1 100.0 100.0 100.0 0.0 9.2 19.2
No. 2 100.0 10.1
No. 3 100.0 100.0 0.8 10.1
No. 4 100.0 1.6
Expected Recovery 100.0 100.0 100.0 0.0 5.0 10.3




   30 
remain likely to accept a consensual plan - when it is finally put forward by the firm. 
Such a prediction is also consistent with the high number of firms that enter protection 
with a backlog of unexploited restructuring opportunities since the incentives to postpone 
such restructurings begin well before any filing.  
 
  Restructurings which involve assets sales face a further hurdle under the Code. 
Both subordinated debt holders and shareholders may expect higher returns if asset sales 
which increase firm value but reduce volatility are delayed, with the costs being borne by 
creditors. Court precedents hold that, absent a ‘good business reason’, ‘equity interests’ 
should be able to block the sale of a major asset, or the company itself, even when both 
the board and the creditors are in favour of a sale. The courts are reluctant to accept 
valuation arguments when there is a dispute about what constitutes a ‘good business 
reason’. 
43  The result is the destruction of value.  
 
  To this point the examples have assumed that ‘the firm’ and shareholders have an 
identity of interest. This assumption, however, is inappropriate for many troubled 
corporations. Both executives and board members may have interests different from those 
of shareholders and creditors. This binomial model can be used to identify key ways in 
which these divergent interests can lead to inefficient results for shareholders and for 
creditors.  
 
  Managers of troubled firms may have a stronger interest in prolonging the 
existing operations of the corporation – and their employment – than in maximizing 
equity value.
44  Downsizing and divestitures may cut the base for their compensation. 
Since the primary responsibility for the evaluation of the reorganization options for the 
firm rests with management, management is in a position where it can slant the analysis 
in ways that favour its interests. The preparation of overly optimistic forecasts, for 
                                                 
43 See Baird [2001], pp. 195-7. Baird provides the illustration of a company that had concluded that a sale 
of a major division was appropriate and the creditors committee agreed. The committee of equity-holders, 
however, objected that the sale should wait. The Circuit court, to which the issue was appealed, concluded 
that under Chapter 11, ‘the equity interest [is] required to be weighed and considered.’ In other words, the 
effect of the sale on the overall firm’s value was not the determining factor, and the sale was blocked.     
44 Inter alia, see Hotchiss [1995]   31 
example, can serve as the basis for preventing a pre-pack, as shown in of Table 2.2. 
Reorganization proposals for the sale or closure of divisions as in the example of Table 
2.3 may simply be ignored. The result is a bias away from socially efficient outcomes.  
 
  Controlling these adverse interests at practical level is difficult due to problems of 
asymmetric information. Corporate boards, while the best source of countervailing 
influence to management, are not free from agency problems. Board members often 
suffer from considerable information asymmetries. They may feel themselves unable or 
unwilling to challenge management, particularly when the chairman is also the chief 
executive. This problem is compounded when individual board members feel their 
personal best interests lie in prolonging their tenure.
 45  To this extent, boards may 
identify their interests with management, and prove ineffective in ensuring the primacy of 
creditor or shareholder interests.  Non-bankruptcy law is said to require that when a firm 
becomes insolvent, the fiduciary duty of directors shifts to the protection of value.
 The 
debtor-in-possession “…must maximize the value of the estate rather than promote the 
interests of any particular group.” 
46 However, there is little evidence that boards of 
insolvent companies feel obliged conduct active due diligence independent of 
management to assess the potential for major divestitures that may enhance value. Nor is 
there much evidence that Boards ensure they are aware of the destruction of potential 
value arising from a prolonged period of protection. The result is a bias away from 
socially efficient outcomes.  
 
  This analysis allows a disentanglement of the several different "costs of 
bankruptcy" that have been proposed in the literature. In popular parlance, the 'costs of 
bankruptcy' conflate two separate notions - the costs of business decline and the costs 
arising from a filing under the bankruptcy code. To identify the costs specifically arising 
because of the filing of a particular firm, a 'hypothetical alternative' must be constructed 
under which bankruptcy is avoided because of the some counterfactual circumstance such 
                                                 
45 See Gilson (1990) whose data suggest that 46% of directors manage to remain in place through a 
bankruptcy and into the corporation exiting from Chapter 11. This is a significant percentage. See also 
Hotchkiss [1995]. 
46 See Baird [2001], p 182.    32 
as a reduced level of debt that allows the firm to escape the need for a filing. Analysis of 
this hypothetical alternative will identify the path of the firm's value and the costs of its 
business decline in the absence of a filing. 
47 When the path of the firm's value under this 
hypothetical alternative is compared to the actual path of the firm's value under 
bankruptcy protection, the costs attributable to the filing can be isolated. In most cases, 
the preponderance of value loss will be attributable to business decline rather than to the 
costs attributable to a filing.  
 
  There are several kinds of costs engendered by a filing or a potential filing. The 
direct costs include the costs of the professionals such as lawyers and accountants, and 
other related out-of-pocket cash costs. While these can be substantial in absolute terms 
48, 
they are unlikely to be large in relation to the total value of the bankrupt corporation. Of 
more significance are the costs arising from the loss of important customers and key staff 
due to the uncertainty that surrounds the future of the bankrupt firm. In addition, there 
may be some costs that are external to the firm. Competitors of the bankrupt firm, for 
example, may suffer losses due to aggressive product pricing by the bankrupt firm which, 
since it does not have to pay the full costs for the capital it uses, may price below full 
cost.  
 
  The largest set of bankruptcy costs arises from the two major incentives for 
resource misallocation and value destruction faced by management and shareholders: the 
incentive to enter into long, value-destroying periods of protection, and the incentive to 
avoid or postpone value accretive reorganizations which reduce volatility. Analysis of the 
extent of these costs can effectively be done only on a case by case basis using 
fundamental analysis that identifies the extent of resource misallocation due to adverse 
incentives. However, the data in Table 1 are suggestive. They indicate that over 30% of 
the bankrupt firms which emerged but did not negotiate with creditors before the filing 
took over 2 years under protection. As has been pointed out above, such a delay is far 
                                                 
47 There may be costs to financial distress short of a bankruptcy. See Opler and Titman, [1994] Such costs 
should not be included within the 'costs of bankruptcy'.  
48 Miller [2008], p. 147, estimates that for large corporate bankruptcies billings can top $100 million per 
year. For a survey of professional costs in bankruptcy see Lubben [2007].   33 
longer than required for the normal company reorganization outside of bankruptcy. 
Around 42% of firms that were ultimately converted for sale or liquidation took over a 
year before the disposition. The delays in achieving agreement on such liquidations 
appear excessive. We are left with a presumption that the perverse incentives arising from 
the Chapter 11 rules do lead to material resource misallocation.   
 
  Bankruptcy leads to significant redistribution of value. The allocation of the costs 
of bankruptcy is included within this value redistribution. As this paper has argued, that 
equity may benefit significantly from bankruptcy rules through its ability to threaten a 
long period of protection. Equity's gain plus the deadweight efficiency costs of 
bankruptcy are funded by losses imposed on other parties. Creditors bear a large portion 
of these losses. 
49   Employees and suppliers are likely to bear some of the losses. Holders 
of rejected executory contracts may also face costs when the assets that are returned to 
them prove to be less profitable than under their original use. When the bankrupt firm 
rejects pension obligations, employees and the Pension Benefit Guarantee Board will also 
suffer costs. 
50 The total of value that is redistributed may often exceed the direct and 
indirect costs due the bankruptcy filing since these redistributional costs include the 
distributional gains made by equity through the consensual agreement.  
 
  The nature of the bankruptcy regime has a high impact on the scale of bankruptcy 
costs and the extent of value redistribution. The earlier sections of this paper have shown 
how extending allowable periods of bankruptcy protection leads to delays in value 
enhancing reorganizations, to value destroying extensions to the stay and to increases in 
the degree of deviation from strict priority. When the analysis is put into this framework, 
it is possible to analyze the costs and redistributional effects of particular provisions of 
the bankruptcy regime, and to examine how changes to these provisions will affect the 
scale of costs and redistributional effects of particular bankruptcies. Increasing allowable 
                                                 
49 Creditors may also bear a large share of the costs of business decline - costs that would have been borne 
by equity had there been no insolvency. These costs of business decline that are absorbed by creditors are 
not properly 'costs of bankruptcy.' If there had been an early pre-pack, distribution by strict priority, and no 
direct or indirect costs resulting from the failure, any losses that would have been left to creditors would be 
losses due to the business decline.  
50 See White [1989, p. 144] for a comment on the Pension Benefit Guarantee Board.    34 
periods of protection will increase loan losses. Lenders, however, will react by tightening 
their lending standards for solvent firms both by increasing spreads and by decreasing the 
amount of credit available. Lending standards will be tightened to the point that expected 
losses are covered and lenders can maintain their expected rates of return. The advantages 
reaped by shareholders in bankrupt firms by the increase in the protection period will be 
shifted by lenders back to the shareholders of solvent firms through an increase in the 
cost of capital. While jobs in insolvent firms may be preserved by increasing the stay 
period, jobs creation among solvent firms will be harmed.  
51 
 
There are two further conclusions that can be drawn from the analysis of this 
section.  
 
First, the achievement of a consensual agreement at some point after the filing 
cannot be taken as evidence that there was no postponement of value-enhancing 
restructurings or that bankruptcy rules produced the efficient outcome that preserved 
maximum value.  
 
Second, the standard assumption of credit models that there exists an exogenous 
process for the evolution in the firm's value is false for many bankrupt firms. The 
usefulness of much of the statistical credit theory is inherently impaired.  
 
 
   
                                                 
51 Crean [2009] derives supply curves for bonds at a market equilibrium where lenders price to ensure 
spreads cover expected losses. Raising the maximum periods of protection allowed in the Code will 
substantially reduce the supply of loanable funds and increase the spreads. The threat of higher loan losses 
through loosened provisions leads lenders to tighten their lending standards and reduce loan supply. 
Williams [2009] argues that the 2005 changes to the Bankruptcy Code which provided lenders with a 
greater measure of control led to the failure of Chapter 11 to save 34,000 jobs in the case of the recent 
bankruptcy of a large retailer. The analytical structure for assessing the implications of particular 
bankruptcy provisions on employment levels proposed in this paper is incomplete and conclusions about 
the overall job impact cannot be sustained. To reach a conclusion about the impact of the 2005 bankruptcy 
reform on employment levels, an analysis must be made of the changes to bank loan origination standards 
as a result of the reform. In market equilibrium, providing debtors with more flexibility will, ceteris 
paribus, lead to reduced lending which, in turn, will lead to reduced job creation by increasing the cost and 
lowering the availability of borrowed capital for solvent employers. The net effect of the 2005 reform on 
employment cannot be determined without completing this analysis.    35 
  3.    Tactics and Bargaining Before a Filing.   
 
The binomial model can be extended to consider another choice variable – the 
timing for a filing. The Code offers wide latitude in the point at which a firm may file. 
52  
Creditors often benefit from a violated debt covenant allowing them to force a filing long 
before the company becomes illiquid or insolvent. In practice, a filing will occur only 
when creditors or the firm reaches the point when a filing serves their best interest, 
whether or not the firm is in default and whether or not it is insolvent. A successful 
theory of bankruptcy must capture how investors, the firm and its shareholders identify 
the points at which filing becomes beneficial to their interests. It must provide a 
negotiation model that applies consistently through the pre-filing workout period and 
during the period of protection. An application of the binomial bargaining model to the 
pre-filing workout period meets these tests. 
53 
 
Consider the firm with the pure risk (and no uncertainty) value process illustrated 
in Table 3.1. At time t-1 the firm’s value is $111.1 million after paying the interest and 
dividends owing at that time. The potential up or down movements in firm value per  
                                                 
52 The relevant sections, §101 and §109, set few criteria that must be met by a corporation prior to filing. 
See also Baird [2001], p. 8.  
53 Various models have been developed to model the decision process of players prior to any filing. 
Anderson and Sundareson [1996] present a binomial model that assumes that a filing leads to an immediate 
liquidation. Value – less some known bankruptcy cost – is distributed according to strict priority. The value 
process is therefore known. There is risk but no uncertainty, and martingale pricing can be developed. 
Under the model, the shareholder is given scope for ‘underperforming’ his payment obligations. The 
shareholder will under-perform at each stage in the process to an extent just below the threshold that 
induces the creditor to file the firm in bankruptcy. The model, however, fails to recognize the link between 
firm volatility and loss on default. Mella-Barral and Perraudin [1997] develop a continuous time asset 
pricing model with perpetual debt that permits strategic debt service. Equity holders are allowed to inject 
capital to cover cash flow shortfalls and hence are assumed to control the timing of any default. In this 
model as well bankruptcy costs are assumed to be known in advance. Martingale pricing is developed and 
optimal strategic debt service identified. As with Anderson and Sundareson [1996], however, there is no 
link drawn between asset volatility and creditor losses in bankruptcy. In effect, such models maintain that 
the effect of asset pricing volatility on security values ends with a filing – an assumption that does not 
accord with market practice. Further, these models rely on martingale pricing which, as this paper argues, is 
inappropriate. Neither does either model consider the bargaining environment following the filing. Neither 
of the models allows for the analysis of the effects of uncertainty.  Aivazian & Callen [1983] propose a 
sophisticated game-theoretic approach under which bond holders and equity holders negotiate the optimal 
timing of a possible default. The model correctly structures the decision process as stretching from initial 
concerns about a potential filing until the debt matures and repaid, or is satisfied through a plan of 
reorganization or liquidation. The filing decision is shown to involve valuation of a lottery over cooperative 
games rather than a lottery over specific monetary outcomes.  
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Table 3.1:      Expected Present Values at t-1 for Creditors and for Shareholders
of Various Alternative Strategies for Bankruptcy Filings.
        Case 1 Variables.  Beginning Firm Value at t-1 111.1
Firm Income at t-1 5.6
Debt 100.0
% Up Movement 10.0%
% Down Movement -10.0%
Probability of Up Movement 50.0%
Probability of Down Movment 50.0%
Risk Free Rate 5.0%
Debt Interest Rate 5.0%
Firm's Rate of Return 5.0%
Rate of Bankruptcy Cost -1.0%
Strategy 1.  Base Case: No Bankruptcy in either t-1 or t0. 
Creditors 105.0
Shareholders 11.7
   Total Firm Value 116.7
Strategy 2. Bankruptcy in t0 only on a down movement 
         in Firm Value:          Change from Strategy 1
Creditors 102.1 -2.9
Shareholders 13.6 1.9
   Total Firm Value 115.7 -1.0
Strategy 3. Bankrupty at t-1          Change from Strategy 1
Creditors 102.0 -0.1
Shareholders 10.4 -3.2
   Total Firm Value 112.4 -3.3
        Case 2 - Changed Variables. 
Probability of Up Movement 40.0%
Probability of Down Movment 60.0%
Strategy 1.  Base Case: No Bankruptcy in either t-1 or t0. 
Creditors 105.0
Shareholders 9.4
   Total Firm Value 114.4
Strategy 2. Bankruptcy in t0 only on a down movement
         in Firm Value:          Change from Strategy 1
Creditors 100.8 -4.2
Shareholders 11.3 1.9
   Total Firm Value 112.1 -2.3
Strategy 3. Bankrupty at t-1          Change from Strategy 1
Creditors 101.4 0.6
Shareholders 8.3 -3.0
   Total Firm Value 109.7 -2.4  
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period are known to be +10% and -10% of the firm’s value. A downward movement 
brings the firm’s value to $100.0 million, exactly the value of its debt. A known 
probability of 50% is attached to each potential movement in the firm’s value. The firm 
generates income at the end of the period equal to 5% of the value of the firm. In the 
absence of bankruptcy filing, the firm pays the creditors’ interest and any principal that 
comes due at the end of the period. The remainder of the income is distributed in a 
dividend to shareholders. The debt of $100 million matures one period later in t0.  This 
debt is secured on the firm’s assets so that interest during any bankruptcy period can be 
claimed by creditors. Interest is payable at the end of each period at the rate of 5%. 
Finally, the applicable indenture or loan agreement contains a financial covenant 
requiring that debt cannot exceed 85% of the firm’s value. Since the level of the firm’s 
debt at t-1 already exceeds this level, creditors have the right – but not the obligation – to 
declare a default, accelerate the debt and force the company into bankruptcy at t-1. The 
applicable bankruptcy law allows a single period of protection after which the firm is sold 
and assets distributed according to strict priority. Should the creditors declare a default 
and precipitate a filing at t-1?  
 
Consider the alternative bankruptcy strategies as viewed by the players at t-1 set 
out in Table 3.1. Both creditors and shareholders can provoke a filing at t-1. In the 
absence of a filing at t-1, creditors will be able to provoke a filing at t0 if there has been a 
downward movement in the firm’s value. The debtor can file at any time. As we are 
dealing with a case of pure risk with no uncertainty, creditors and shareholders will make 
identical calculations of the net benefits attaching their own and their opponent’s 
potential bankruptcy strategies. These estimates form the basis for negotiation between 
the parties ‘in the shadow of bankruptcy’.  
 
Under Strategy 1, if there is no filing in either t-1 or t0, creditors will be paid the 
interest owed during the period ending at t-1 and then will be paid interest and full 
principal at t0. The t-1 present value to creditors of these expected cash flows is $105 
million ($5.0 million interest at t-1 and $105 million interest and principal at t0, 
discounted to t-1.). Strategy 1, however, provides no return to shareholders should the   38 
value of the firm drop since the full value will be paid to creditors on maturity of the debt 
in t0. Shareholders achieve a return only if the firm’s value moves upward to $122.2 
million. The present expected value to shareholders from Strategy 1 is $11.7 million, 
arising entirely from the potential for an up movement in the firm’s value during the 
period ending in t0. 
 
Under Strategy 2 with a prospective filing in t0, the discounted expected returns at 
t-1 for shareholders improve to $13.6 million. Creditors will therefore expect that 
shareholders will adopt the strategy of a t0 filing. The result of this strategy, however, is a 
drop in the firm’s expected value at t-1 by $1 million to $115.7 million and a drop in 
creditors’ expected returns by $2.9 million to $102.1 million. Creditors will not chose 
Strategy 3 since they cannot improve their expected recovery by calling a default in t-1, 
even though the firm is in a clear violation of the financial covenant in its debt 
agreement.  
 
Such an analysis by interested parties provides the basis for pricing the firm’s 
securities at t-1. Under the initial set of variables in Table 3.1, in t-1 creditors have a 
discounted expected present value of recoveries of $102.1 million composed of an 
interest payment of $5.0 million at t-1 and a present value of recoveries from a t0 
bankruptcy of $97.1 million. They therefore face a loss of $2.9 million on the value of the 
debt.  Under applicable accounting rules they will have to recognize this loss at t-1. Where 
replacement lenders are satisfied with earning the risk free rate of return, as has been 
assumed in this simplified example, the debt may be sold or refinanced at $97.1 million. 
Similarly, in t-1, equity has a value of at least $13.6 million.   
 
Under conditions of pure risk and no uncertainty, in the absence of bargaining 
inefficiencies, there will always be a negotiated settlement that avoids the cost of 
bankruptcy and divides the dividend from avoided bankruptcy costs between the parties. 
An agreement may emerge in t-1 under which the value of the debt is cut to $97.1 (at 
which point shareholders no longer have any credible threat to bankrupt the firm at t0) 
and interest of $5 million is paid plus the negotiated creditors' share of the dividend. The   39 
equity value will be $13.7 million plus equity’s negotiated share in the dividend from 
avoiding the costs of bankruptcy. The model indicates that in the period before any filing 
the value of the debt will be priced to reflect the expected gains from deviations from 
strict priority net of the costs of any potential bankruptcy, and the value of equity will rise 
to reflect the value of the option held by equity to pursue a single period of bankruptcy in 
t0.  
 
The choice of optimal filing strategy is highly dependent on the values of the 
variables as viewed by the players. The bottom panel of Table 3.1 shows the effect of a 
drop in the probability of an up movement to 40% and a corresponding increase in the 
probability of a down movement to 60%. Under these circumstances, the preference of 
shareholders remains Strategy 2. Creditors, however, now can improve their position 
under Strategy 3 by exercising their right to call a default at t-1 which yields an 
improvement in their position of $0.6. They will therefore choose the strategy of a 
threatened filing at this point. The result will be a pre-pack in t-1 with creditors recovering 
at least $101.4.  
 
This example shows how securities of distressed firms will be priced in the 
periods before any actual filing in a manner that reflects the ability of the firm or its 
creditors to force a filing at a time of their choosing.  
 
This binomial model of bargaining ‘under the shadow of bankruptcy’ can be 
extended in three further directions.  
 
First, uncertainty can be handled in the same manner as in the post-filing period 
by directly modelling the diverging views of creditors and shareholders and exploring 
whether a consensual agreement can be reached within the parameters resulting from 
their beliefs about the firm's future value.  
 
Second, the model can be used to explore the implications of restructuring options 
on filing decisions. Creditors may be prepared to waive defaults and extend further credit   40 
in return for the firm committing to promptly undertake options which improve creditor 
recoveries. By comparing payouts to creditors and to equity with and without the 
restructuring, the model will indicate whether or not there is mutual interest in the firm 
committing to the restructuring in a period before any filing in return for creditor 
concessions. The model thus captures this standard type of negotiation between a banker 
and a firm in financial distress.  
 
Finally, the binomial model can be extended to incorporate tranches of debt and 
equity carrying various levels of seniority. The holders of each of these classes of 
security would perform their own analysis to identify their interest in the various 
bankruptcy options that are open to them under the terms of their securities.  
 
From this analysis, it is clear that the binomial model can be extended to the pre-
filing period in a manner that allows the tactical options of the various players to provoke 
a filing to be captured by the analysis. The approach therefore provides a bargaining 
model that applies consistently through the pre-filing periods and into the post filing 
periods of protection, and meets a key criterion for a successful model of bankruptcy 
negotiation.  
 
This analysis indicates that bankruptcy models or security pricing models which 
assume a mechanistic default threshold based on ratios such as debt-to-equity or cash 
flow coverage tests will miss the effect of strategic decision-making by the firm and its 
creditors. Neither creditors nor the debtor can be expected automatically to file for 
bankruptcy when some pre-determined threshold has been reached. In many cases, the 
filing will take place before the threshold is reached; in others it will take place after the 
threshold is breached. Using a deterministic model for the default threshold will result in 
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  4.  "Gone Concern" Analysis in the Real World 
 
While firms and investors do not use the binomial model to establish their 
workout tactics or to price securities in distressed firms, their bargaining strategies are 
formed using the logic that has been developed using the binomial model. The analytical 
approach to estimating firm values in the market place is sometimes called "gone 
concern" analysis. It generates estimates of the likely range of values of the firm at the 
end of a potential period of bankruptcy protection and the estimates of the related 
probabilities.  
 
  The starting point for estimating the potential for paths for the firm's value is the 
past operating history of the firm, along with a consideration of the firm's competitive 
position in the marketplace. Potential programs of asset sales and downsizing programs, 
along with an estimate of their potential impact on firm value and volatility are identified. 
The tax implications and the potential accounting treatments for the various options must 
be analyzed. The liquidity position of the firm, including requirements for committed 
new spending and the effect of any debt maturities or potential debt defaults, must be 
evaluated.  
 
  While the method for estimating the cash flows and firm values differ radically 
from the lattice of the binomial model, the end product is similar. The results of 'gone 
concern' analysis are typically presented with a 'most likely' case, plus an 'up-side' and a 
'down-side', along with estimated probabilities attached to each case. Such results look 
like the outcomes pictured at Time 2 in Figure 2.2. This puts the analysis of negotiating 
strategies back into the framework developed in previous sections of this paper. The firm, 
its shareholders and its creditors will each use their forecast of these values to evaluate 
the recoveries they can expect to receive in liquidation. From this analysis, each group 
will establish its tactical bargaining position. The analysis follows the logic outlined in 
the previous sections. The results parallel the outcomes generated by the binomial model 
developed in Sections 2 and 3.   
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  Typically, the firm, its creditors and its shareholders will commence 'gone 
analysis' when the probability of financial distress becomes significant - and in any case 
well before any filing. In the periods before any filing, the bargaining positions will be 
established in the manner outlined in Section 3.  
 
  Because of its intimate knowledge of the firm, its risks and opportunities, 
management has a considerable advantage in conducting gone concern analysis. 
Management is fully aware of any potential default conditions and of the firm's liquidity 
position. Since the firm typically initiates any petition in bankruptcy, it can control the 
timing of the filing. This provides it with a range of options to improve its position prior 
to any filing. The firm, for example, can draw down of unused committed lines of credit 
to maximize available cash. It can place excess cash with a bank that is outside of its 
group of lending institutions to avoid any rights of set-off by existing lenders. The firm 
can maximize of both inventory and accounts payable before the point of filing.  
 
  In contrast, firm that wishes to postpone a filing can curtail any unnecessary 
spending to conserve liquidity. It may be able to securitize assets or use other financing 
mechanisms that subordinate the position of existing creditors and supply the firm with 
extra liquidity. Such firms stretch applicable accounting principles to minimize the 
impression given to markets of its degree of financial stress and to preserve access to 
supplier and other credit.  
 
  Creditors also have options to protect their position. In forming their views of the 
company, creditors must assess the likelihood of such maneuvers by management as well 
as the other factors that can affect the firm's value and their recoveries. Creditors can 
reduce uncommitted exposures. Trade creditors can tighten the conditions of their 
shipments.
 54  Term creditors will closely watch for any potential defaults in their lines 
and those of other creditors. Since the recoveries by any one creditor are affected by the 
recovery tactics of other creditors, tactical plans by individual groups will be formed with 
a close examination of the likely tactics of other groups.   
                                                 
54 See Smith [1987] and Ng, Smith and Smith [1999] for a models of credit control by trade creditors.    43 
 
  In an ideal world, agreement on a financial restructuring should be completed 
without the need a formal filing with its attendant costs. Such agreements, however, are 
rare. When the do occur, hold-out groups of creditors typically insist on minimal debt 
reduction. The result is that companies which opt for an informal financial restructuring 
often fail to shed sufficient debt for them to become viable.
55 As a result, restructurings 
typically take place through formal bankruptcy procedures which, with their voting rules, 
allow the consenting majorities of creditors to bind the 'hold-out' minorities to a plan of 
financial reorganization that achieves a more viable level of debt reduction.  
 
  Significant leverage can often be exercised by investors who attain one of other of 
two key control thresholds - either a one third blocking position in the value of one or 
more classes of debt, or a two thirds controlling position in the value of one or more 
classes of debt plus 50% of the votes in such classes. Achieving such voting control 
improves the credibility of creditors in their petitions to the court about the likelihood of 
a consensual plan. The result can be an improvement in the recoveries to creditors. Funds 
and other investors who specialize in the analysis and purchase of distressed securities 
frequently base their strategies on achieving control of one or more classes of the 
distressed corporation's securities. The past couple of decades have seen the development 
of a deep market for the debt and shares of distressed companies.
 56 
 
In summary, the basic conclusions reached using the binomial model - deviations 
from strict priority, the occurrence of extended period of protection, and the likelihood of 
substantial resource misallocation arising from the incentives embedded in bankruptcy 
rules - all apply when the firm's terminal values are estimated through the standard type 
of  'gone concern' analysis found in the marketplace.  
 
 
                                                 
55 Gilson [1997] provides evidence that firms which try to reorganize outside of bankruptcy fail to shed 
sufficient debt and a significant percentage subsequently face financial distress. The high percentage of re-
filings for pre-packs shown in Table 1 suggests that these negotiations frequently result in inadequate debt 
conversion.  
56 See Rosenberg [1990] for some examples. See also Hotchkiss and Mooradian [1997]   44 
      4.  Conclusion 
 
  This paper started with a look at the patterns of bankruptcy outcomes that are 
inadequately explained by the current literature – widespread and significant deviations 
from strict priority, significant equity prices for companies that are insolvent, and highly 
variable and frequently long periods of bankruptcy protection. A review of the literature 
bearing on these issues indicated four major strands of analysis which were largely 
unconnected. The large body of legal analysis focusing on bankruptcy objectives and 
processes contains few models of bargaining and provides little explanation for the 
observed patterns of bankruptcy outcomes. The papers on agency theory containing 
implications for bankruptcy processes provide insight into bargaining incentives, but 
contain no analysis of broad patterns of outcomes. The literature of stochastic models of 
credit risk focussing almost exclusively on the period prior to the filing provides little 
guidance on bargaining process or loss on default outcomes. Finally, the multivariate 
statistical models of credit risk are useful predictors of default and loss, but contain no 
bargaining models that can assist in explaining the reasons for the wide variation in 
outcomes.   
 
   The paper developed a simple binomial model of bargaining under the shadow of 
bankruptcy. The model departs from earlier finance studies in rejecting the assumption of 
a stopped value process at the point of filing in favour of running the process through the 
pre-bankruptcy period until the maturity of the debt or the finalizing of a bankruptcy 
process. The model is structured to reflect those provisions of the Code that affect the 
management of the bankruptcy process and the ultimate allocation of value. The model 
predicts that significant deviations from strict priority will be accepted by senior creditors 
in consensual agreements because it is in their interests to do so. This result arises 
because of the interaction of the volatility in the firm’s value and the bankruptcy process 
rules included in the Code. The does not rely on some reference to the ‘costs of 
bankruptcy’ to achieve this result. The analysis points out that most of the statistical 
models of credit risk that are based on 'risk free' arbitrage cannot be complete in a 
Chapter 11 environment and martingale pricing for credit risk cannot be achieved.    45 
 
  The model predicts that the losses will be higher for firms or industries with 
higher volatility, a result that is consistent with market observations. The model also 
predicts that rights issues will generally be an unattractive solution to financial distress 
for shareholders compared to the results obtainable from a Chapter 11 filing – again a 
result that corresponds to market observations. Addition of uncertainty to the model leads 
to a prediction that debtors and their creditors may well be unable to achieve a consensual 
restructuring agreement before a filing, and that periods of bankruptcy protection may be 
prolonged – again a result that is consistent with observed outcomes. The model 
identifies potential shareholder interest in delaying restructurings or asset sales which 
lower the volatility of firm value even though they increase firm value. The model thus 
explains why so many firms enter bankruptcy with a backlog of un-started reorganization 
plans. The introduction of uncertainty and the identification of this class of restructurings 
in which shareholders may wish to delay ties into the analysis proposed by papers on 
agency theory. Finally, the model provides strong support for the notion advanced in a 
variety of legal studies of bankruptcy that the process is structured in a way that provides 
strong incentives for management and shareholder behaviour that destroys firm value.  
 
  When extended to the pre-filing period, the model meets the criterion of providing 
single, consistent bargaining model that can be applied both before and after any filing. It 
allows for an analysis of the interplay of interests which generate optimal bankruptcy 
strategies for the players. It allows for estimates of the minimal discounted expected 
values for the various securities which produce lower bounds for the pricing of the 
securities of the distressed firm, and it identifies the range of savings that can be achieved 
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